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Convention on Human Rights, Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and Covenant 
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. 
LOREN E. LOMASKY 
University of Minnesota, Duluth 
Najita, Tetsuo. Visions of Virtue in TokugawaJapan: The Kaitokud5 Merchant Academy 
of Osaka. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987. Pp. x+334. $14.95 (paper). 
It will soon be the case that worthwhile work in moral philosophy will require a 
detailed knowledge of more than one social and cultural order, if only because 
comparison and contrast are a necessary part of the work of elucidation. Moreover, 
ancient Athenian thought and practice are too familiar, too ingrained in our 
educational inheritance, to perform this function adequately. It is going to become 
necessary to learn Swahili or Urdu or Japanese. A foretaste of how worthwhile 
this can be is afforded by Tetsuo Najita's splendid book. 
The Kaitokud6 was an academy in the merchant city of Osaka, founded in 
1726 and closed down at the end of the Tokugawa regime in 1868. It was a 
center for scholarship and moral teaching, educating the intellectual leadership 
of the merchant class in a society dominated by samurai and by samurai values. 
It was in the course of a systematic challenge to the samurai worldview that 
accounts of the virtues and vices, intellectual and moral, were elaborated by the 
teachers of the Kaitokud6. Najita's study provides within the framework of its 
history of the academy an introduction to a strikingly wide range of philosophical 
and practical standpoints. Here are thinkers of high importance about whom 
almost all of us are barbarously ignorant. 
Two philosophical themes stand out. The first is a contrast between the 
appeal to history made by the ideologues of the samurai regime and the appeal 
to nature made by the moral theorists of the Kaitokud6. This opposition emerges 
not only in rival theorizing but also in rival interpretations of the same classical 
moral texts. So the Tokugawa scholar Yamaga Sok6 could argue that the ideals 
portrayed in the Analects were the historical creation of a particular class, in the 
light of whose moral achievements the present samurai must evaluate himself 
and others. By contrast, Miyake Sekian found in the Analects warrant for the 
view that every human being is by nature a sage and that the teachings of the 
great sages articulate a virtue native to every human being. Miyake dismisses the 
notion that the virtues are contrivances to sustain public order; they are those 
dispositions by exhibiting which human beings exhibit their true nature. 
A second theme is the working out of an epistemology which entails a 
mitigated, nonrelativistic skepticism, one that allows its adherents both to challenge 
claims to knowledge and to authority based on knowledge in a socially effective 
way. The philosophical interest lies of course in the detailed formulation of such 
claims. Here Najita's elegant summaries provide enough to make one want much 
more. 
This is a sociological history of the first order, a major contribution to the 
comparative study of the virtues, and one which stimulates crucial questions. 
Which of the several Western conceptions of nature correspond to the conception 
of the Kaitokud6 thinkers? What weight does the expression translated by 
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"knowledge" carry? Najita's book must be read, and the first result of reading it 
may well be increased enrollment in courses in the Japanese language. 
ALASDAIR MACINTYRE 
Vanderbilt University 
Hourani, George. Reason and Tradition in Islamic Ethics. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985. Pp. xv+282. $39.50 (cloth). 
It is doubtful that anyone in North America knew more about Muslim philosophical 
and theological ethics than the late George Hourani, Distinguished Professor of 
Islamic Thought and Civilization at the State University of New York at Buffalo. 
He has asserted his authority in a series of previously published articles and 
papers. The book contains a preface by Hourani, a foreword by Michael E. 
Marmura of the University of Toronto, a listing of conventions, the titles and 
locations of the original articles, and an introduction by Hourani. 
The kinds of ethics discussed are ethical theory in the theological and 
philosophical modes (but not normative ethics) and essays on classical Sunnite 
thought with the addition of pieces on philosophers, namely, Averroes on good 
and evil, Ibn Sind on destiny, the rationalistic ethics of Abd al-Jabbar Juwayni's 
criticism of Mu'tazilite ethics, and a comparison of the method of deliberation 
in the latter as compared with Aristotle. 
In his first chapter Hourani outlines various presuppositions of the book. 
He holds here that the ontological status of value in ethics has to be settled and 
the status of human knowledge of values in ethics must be established. Three 
Muslim positions were held on these problems. 
First, values may have an objective existence and can be known independently 
of human reason or may be known from scriptural tradition. This was the position 
of Mu'tazilite theologians. Second, values are whatever God commands and hence 
can be known only from tradition with subordinate aid in "extending" tradition 
by reason. This position was held by the Ash'arites and most Islamic jurists. 
Third, values are objective and can be known entirely by the reason of wise 
people, "including philosophers." These "objective" values, however, are expounded 
by prophets for the benefit of the common people. This is the position of the 
Islamic philosophers, according to Hourani. He cites no exceptions. 
The second chapter deals with ethics in classical Islam and highlights the 
struggle between tradition and authority on the one hand and reason on the 
other. It differs from European ethical development partly because of the impact 
of juridical views. We see some parallel development of this kind in India from 
circa 600-300 B.C. Theistic subjectivism is powerful, a synonym being ethical 
voluntarism. It is the judge who decides (Jerome Frank of the Yale Law School 
pointed out that the law is what the judges say it is). This is subjective. It is 
purported to be God who decides. As such it is theistic. 
It is a weakness of writers on Islamic ethics that they seldom give examples 
of the substantive issues, such as conflicting claims to property, which could give 
the reader a clue as to why there could be such excited disagreement among 
philosophers, theologians, and jurists. In this sense, much of the writing on 
Islamic ethics tends to be presociological. The reader may feel that he is in a 
vacuum of testy wordmongers. What follows for the reader is an excercise in the 
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